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ABSTRACT
This article aims to verify what the influence is of different disclosure activities on the concentration of more sophisticated 
investors in Brazilian companies. The study fills a gap regarding the influence that disclosure activities can have on the 
concentration of sophisticated investors in Brazilian firms, considering that this may occur due to their ability to maximize 
the usefulness of the information disclosed and the return on investments, with a reduction in the cost of allocated funds. 
This subject is relevant because it verifies not the clientless effect of disclosure, presented by the only study previously 
developed on the subject in the United States (Kalay, 2015), but rather the influence that disclosure activities (earnings 
forecasts, market communications, and investor relations [IR]) have on the most sophisticated investors’ decisions to allocate 
funds in companies in the Brazilian market. As an impact on the area, it was noted that those companies that release market 
communications attract the investment of funds and the concentration of sophisticated investors much more than those 
that present better IR and release profit forecasts. We studied 89 publicly-traded companies whose reference forms were 
published in the period from 2011 to 2016. The number of institutional investors disclosed in the reference forms was used 
as a proxy to categorize them as more sophisticated. The different disclosure activities were represented by the disclosure 
of profit forecasts, the number of market communications, and the best IR. The best IR proxy was categorized using the 
companies awarded by IR Magazine Brazil that presented the best IR in the study period. The results of this study show that 
the most sophisticated investors concentrated in companies with better IR, in those that do not disclose profit forecasts, 
and in companies with a greater number of disclosed market communications. The disclosure of market communications 
is the disclosure activity that most influences the concentration of sophisticated investors in Brazilian companies that use 
more voluntary disclosure than discretionary disclosure to allocate their funds. 
Keywords: sophisticated investor, disclosure activities, theory of disclosure.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Investor sophistication can be understood using 
different focuses. Under the usefulness of information 
focus, Easley and O’Hara (2010) relate the sophistication 
of investors with their capacity to maximize the usefulness 
of the information relating to their investments. When 
market trading is emphasized, Koehler (2014) indicates 
that sophisticated investors are able to judge the risk of 
information, independently of the activity through which 
it was disclosed. 
Disclosure activities can benefit more sophisticated 
investors when they have the ability to maximize the 
usefulness of information relating to their investments 
(Feng & Seasholes, 2005). These activities can facilitate 
the understanding of these investors, depending on their 
capacity to analyze information.
In the only study previously developed on the topic 
in the United States, Kalay (2015) investigated whether 
different disclosure activities caused the clientless effect, 
which consisted of an event in which companies used 
different disclosure activities to attract more sophisticated 
investors.
Unlike Kalay (2015), the main contribution of this 
proposed study to the literature is to verify not the 
clientless effect of disclosure, but rather the influence 
of earnings forecasts, market communications, and 
investor relations (IRs) disclosure activities on the most 
sophisticated investors’ decisions to allocate funds in 
companies in the Brazilian market.
Two types of disclosure underpinned by the theory of 
disclosure were selected for this study: the discretionary 
disclosure of market operations and voluntary disclosure, 
considering the predictive capacity of investors in both 
cases and the interest in maximizing the return obtained 
from investing funds in assets that they believe to have 
earnings potential (Mao & Helliwell, 1969).
The classification of the theory between discretionary 
and voluntary disclosure was used as a support for 
investigating the influence of the disclosure activities 
over the allocation of funds by investors in companies. An 
increase in the precision of the information would reduce 
market uncertainty (Kim & Lim, 2011) and influence 
the most sophisticated investors into concentrating their 
investments in firms that practice discretionary disclosure. 
The capacity of sophisticated investors to better evaluate 
the performance of companies that practice voluntary 
disclosure provides these investors with an advantage 
over other investors (Kim & Verrecchia, 1994) and this 
influences them into allocating their investments in firms 
that practice that type of disclosure.
Sophisticated investors want to maximize the return 
on their investments, and it is via the disclosure activities 
that these investors make their decisions to allocate 
funds. If the activity is discretionary, investors will be 
more likely to use the disclosure of earnings forecasts 
as a support for allocating their investments; if the 
activity is voluntary, investors will tend to allocate their 
investments in companies that communicate better with 
the market or that are a reference in IR. Sophisticated 
investors will use the information disclosed voluntarily 
to make decisions.
Under this approach, the proposed study seeks to 
answer the following question: what is the influence 
of disclosure activities on the concentration of more 
sophisticated investors in Brazilian companies?
Regarding the conceptual relationship between 
disclosure activities and sophisticated investors, the 
proposal of this study was built based on the influence 
(Feng & Seasholes, 2005)sophistication (static differences 
across investors that these activities can have on the 
concentration of sophisticated investors in companies, 
considering that this may occur due to the capacity of 
investors to maximize the usefulness of the information 
disclosed (Easley and O’Hara, 2010). The proposed study 
is based on both voluntary and obligatory disclosure, 
separated into three different disclosure activities: better 
IR (more disclosure), disclosure of earnings forecasts 
(voluntary), and market communications (obligatory).
The importance of this study lies in verifying whether 
those companies that present better IR and that release 
earnings forecasts and market communications also attract 
a greater quantity of sophisticated investors in Brazil. 
The proxy used to define sophisticated investors was the 
number of institutional investors, as used by Sias and 
Starks (1997) and Girão (2016) in their studies.
The studies by Sias and Starks (1997) and Girão 
(2016) were chosen because they identified the returns 
on portfolios dominated by institutional investors that, as 
they are better informed, outperformed the returns on the 
portfolios of individual investors (Sias & Starks, 1997). The 
quantity of institutional investors and analysts’ forecasts 
were able to optimize company trading on the market 
by reducing the companies’ cost of capital (Girão, 2016).
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theory of disclosure explains that there can be three 
types of disclosure in the market: external, to investors 
in general; discretionary, to investors that have prior 
knowledge of the information; and voluntary, to investors 
that have no prior knowledge of the information in the 
market (Verrecchia, 2001).
Independently of the type of disclosure, Hand (1990) 
demonstrated that institutional investors are the market 
agents with the most ability to maximize the usefulness 
of the information disclosed. For Kalay (2015), they are 
able to maximize the usefulness of information regardless 
of whether it is public or private. 
These investors’ capacity to maximize information is 
related to the fact that they are more sophisticated (Cia, 
Guarita & Cia, 2002; Ferri & Soares, 2009). With regards 
to this, Kalay (2015) indicates that sophisticated investors 
are those that have the ability to use the information 
available to obtain an advantage. These investors make 
more effective decisions and have more capacity to access 
different sources of information, especially when that 
information has not been disclosed voluntarily (Balsam, 
Bartov & Marquardt, 2002).
Sophisticated investors in an environment of non-
voluntary disclosure are less susceptible to a lack of 
impartiality of information. Voluntary disclosure 
has been used with the aim of promoting the use of 
management ideas that are able to provide an increase 
in the potential of companies for the interested parties 
(Abeysekera & Guthrie, 2005). All the information 
disclosed by companies that goes beyond the information 
required by laws, standards, or regulatory bodies is 
considered to be voluntary (Zaini, Samkin, Sharma & 
Davey, 2018).
Voluntary information can be presented in various 
forms: monetary, quantitative, non-monetary, and 
qualitative or narrative. In addition, it occurs at different 
levels, depending on the circumstances in which it 
originated (Zaini et al., 2018). Investors with a high level 
of sophistication dedicate more time to their investments 
and, for that reason, outperform compared to the rest 
(Kalay, 2015), especially when avoiding losses and making 
more assertive decisions in the market is concerned (Ferg 
& Seasholes, 2005).
Investment analysts’ forecasts enhance the 
sophistication of investors in the market. A good analysts’ 
forecast influences both the sophistication of investors 
and the behavior of the market itself to accommodate 
this type of investor.
The study by Irvine (2004) confirmed that analysts’ 
forecasts have a positive impact on share prices. When 
these shares become more profitable, there is an increase 
in the demand on the part of investors for these analysts’ 
forecasts. These analysts’ projections influence the effect 
of the concentration of investments in companies that 
present better share price performance.
Independently of companies’ disclosure in the market 
being discretionary or voluntary, analysts’ forecasts 
can influence the concentration of more sophisticated 
investors when they project their recommendations as 
being the best investment opportunities. 
The studies by Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 
(1983), Moshirian, Ng, and Wu (2009), and Sidhu and Tan 
(2011) confirmed the influence of analysts’ forecasts in 
three ways: investors tolerate the cost of allocated capital 
when analysts recommend certain investments with a 
history of positive and successive returns in the market; 
analysts tend to recommend these investments as more 
lucrative opportunities for investors to allocate their funds; 
and analysts with accurate recommendations concentrate 
more on investor demands than on external market events 
when establishing forecasts.
Haziza and Kalay (2014) say that sophisticated investors 
focus their attentions on investments with a high degree 
of informational asymmetry and little liquidity so that 
institutional investors benefit more in environments where 
there is high asymmetry. In the United States, practicing 
selective disclosure of information to the market, as well as 
the “natural” asymmetry between managers and investors, 
led to asymmetric disclosure among investors themselves. 
This situation gave rise to the fair disclosure regulation, 
better known as RegFD, which regulated the disclosure 
activities of companies participating in the U.S. capital 
market.
As a result of the enactment of this regulation in 
the United States, CVM Instruction n. 358 (Brazilian 
Securities and Exchance Commission - Comissão de 
Valores Mobiliários [CVM], 2002), which institutionalized 
disclosure practices in Brazil, was approved in accordance 
with the RegFD regulations. This instruction foresaw 
the disclosure of all relevant facts to investors so that 
information should be disclosed in a comprehensive way 
and released to all, as supported by the first approach 
of the theory of disclosure, which supports the general 
disclosure of information to all investors.
RegFD listed what information should be disclosed 
and what communication channels should be used so that 
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the simultaneous and equal disclosure of that information 
among investors can occur.
The three classifications of the theory of disclosure 
(Verrecchia, 2001) support the possibility of different 
disclosure activities benefiting (or potentially attracting) 
sophisticated investors. 
The interest of investors in enhancing the return 
obtained from allocating funds in assets they believe 
to have earnings potential (Mao & Helliwell, 1969) and 
the discretionary and voluntary disclosure in the market 
influence investors in their decisions regarding where 
to hold the funds invested. This can be explained by the 
level of sophistication of these investors in maximizing 
the usefulness of the information disclosed and the return 
on their investments by reducing the cost of allocated 
capital. This approach supports the following research 
hypothesis:
H1: different disclosure activities positively influence the 
concentration of more sophisticated investors in Brazilian 
companies.
With the assumption that the information disclosed 
through different disclosure activities can positively 
influence the concentration of more sophisticated 
investors (Balsam, Bartov & Marquardt, 2002), the proxy 
used to define the level of sophistication was the quantity 
of institutional investors of companies listed on the Brasil, 
Bolsa, Balcão (B3) exchange, as according to the studies 
by Balsan et al. (2002), Kimball and Shumway (2010), 
Koehler (2014), and Girão (2016).
Girão (2016) used the quantity of institutional investors 
to categorize the dependent variable of the proposed 
theoretical model. The number of investors was used as a 
proxy for competition for better information as being able 
to reduce the cost of own capital in companies located in 
a previously poor institutional environment.
Kimball and Shumway (2010) related the sophistication 
of investors to the size of their participation in international 
investments, to the diversification measures used by 
them, and to their participation in equities. The authors 
discovered that sophisticated investors are more likely 
to master a greater quantity of information, which leads 
them to invest more in the capital market or to hold their 
investments in a particular company.
Koehler (2014) highlighted that sophisticated investors 
are able to judge the risk of information even before that 
information is disclosed. 
Balsam et al. (2002) studied the relationship between 
investor sophistication, accounting adjustments, and 
the increase in the net equity value of organizations. 
The authors proposed that more sophisticated investors 
are more able to identify discretionary accounting 
adjustments in financial statements and, consequently, 
add more value to equity. They also discovered that 
sophisticated investors, backed by a good analysts’ 
forecast, influence the market’s reaction regarding the 
price of the securities traded. In turn, the occurrence 
of these events is favored by the existence of different 
disclosure activities that influence the actions of 
sophisticated investors in the market.
Ranking companies that present better IR can lead to 
a psychological effect on institutional investors so that 
they will focus their investments in companies that always 
present a good IR concept. In addition, companies that 
present better IR also present better financial results, 
which can contribute to concentrating institutional 
investors in these companies (Balsam et al., 2002).
In the case of disclosing earnings forecasts and market 
communications, more sophisticated investors tend to 
use that information to allocate a greater sum of funds to 
companies that present better payment forecasts in terms 
of returns on shareholder investments and, consequently, 
institutional investors tend to concentrate in companies 
that communicate better with the market (Girão, 2016).
The proxies for defining the disclosure activities were 
characterized by the IR Magazine Brazil (http: //events.
irmagazine.com /brazil/) awards to the companies that 
had the best IR and disclosure of market communications 
and of earnings forecasts extracted from the reference 
forms of the firms in the sample, as according to the study 
by Kalay (2015). That study, in turn, identified that the 
demand for disclosure from sophisticated investors is 
partially driven by their capacity to use the information, 
which may be favored by the type of disclosure activity.
3. METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
3.1 Universe and Sample
To achieve the research objective, the time horizon was 
defined according to the availability of the data collected 
from the reference forms and from the Thomson Reuters® 
database.
Reference forms, the main source of data, only became 
obligatory in 2010; however, if the time period of the study 
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was defined as starting in the first year the report was 
mandatory, the sample studied would be reduced, since 
balanced panel data were chosen and some companies 
did not present all the necessary data, thus implying a 
study period between 2011 and 2016.
Although the focus of the study is the period from 
2011 to 2016, the data relating to 2010 were used as a 
sensitivity test for the results, as described in section 
3.3 (Control Variables and Econometric Model).
The universe studied covered all the companies that 
trade shares on the B3, totaling 475. The research sample 
was defined based on active companies, excluding those 
from the financial sector, those with a greater number of 
institutional investors than the total number of Brazilian 
investors, and those that did not present the necessary 
data for all the years.
The final sample was composed of 89 companies listed 
on the B3 and with available data between 2011 and 2016, 
as described in Table 1.
Table 1
Research sample
Criteria Companies (n) %
Companies listed on the Brasil, Bolsa, 
Balcão exchange
475 100
(-) Companies listed in the financial 
sector
200 42.11
(-) Companies with missing data or 
a greater number of institutional 
investors than the Brazilian total
186 39.16
(=) Final sample 89 18.73
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The companies from the financial sector were excluded 
from the sample for carrying out activities with their own 
institutional characteristics, making the result obtained 
discrepant in relation to the others. 
The impact of eliminating the companies listed as 
financial sector was to reduce the number that could 
participate in the study by approximately 42%. This made 
it impossible to investigate what disclosure activities 
can influence the concentration of funds allocated by 
investors in companies from the financial sector, which 
correspond to almost half of the companies listed on the 
Brazilian stock market. 
A balanced panel was chosen due to the “inconstancy” 
of the information disclosed by the companies, that is, 
information or disclosure in a particular year, especially 
when voluntary, is not necessarily disclosed in the 
following year, which makes identifying changes in the 
disclosure strategy of the companies studied difficult (a 
higher or lower level of disclosure).
Some of the reasons that may explain the “inconstancy” 
in the disclosure of information on the part of some 
companies derived from their disclosure strategy. From 
the perspective of Snow and Hambrick (1980), in order to 
be able to incorporate strategic changes of the companies 
being investigated, it is necessary to consider a minimum 
interval of five years of data for every organization studied, 
which led the authors of the proposed study to consider 
the effects of these possible events on the econometric 
model.
3.2 Measurement of Investor Sophistication and 
Disclosure Activities
To analyze the influence of disclosure activities on the 
concentration of institutional investors, the methodology 
of the research in question was based on the study by 
Kalay (2015). In that study, Kalay (2015) developed a 
new measure for quantifying sophisticated investors, 
called open interest, calculated based on data relating to 
the trading of share options on the U.S. financial market. 
However, due to the low liquidity in the Brazilian options 
market compared to the U.S. market, we chose to use a 
proxy variable in substitution of the measure used.
The proxy variable used to measure the number of 
sophisticated investors considered the existing literature 
that defined institutional investors as sophisticated and 
more able to monitor and discipline company managers 
(Ferri & Soares, 2009). In addition, the measure took 
previous studies into account, such as those by Balsam 
et al. (2000), Kimball and Shumway (2010), Koehler 
(2014), and Girão (2016), which used the number of 
institutional investors as a proxy for sophisticated investors. 
Institutional investors were defined by Cia et al. (2000) 
as those that trade a large quantity of shares on global 
financial markets, which correspond to pension funds, 
mutual funds, employee funds, insurance companies, 
and financial institutions.
The proxy called “number of institutional investors” 
(NII) corresponded to the natural logarithm of the number 
of institutional investors disclosed in the reference forms 
plus 1. Adding the value 1 was an attempt to ensure that 
even those companies that did not present institutional 
investors were in the sample studied.
Regarding the different disclosure activities, three 
different types of communication involving companies 
and their shareholders were analyzed: IR, earnings 
forecasts, and market communications.
Concerning IR, better investor relations practices 
were measured using a dummy variable based on the 
IR Magazine Brazil awards to companies with the best 
investor relations programs. For the winning companies, 
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the IR dummy variable took the value 1; otherwise the 
variable took the value 0.
Earnings forecasts correspond to non-mandatory 
information; for this reason this was measured based on 
a dummy variable called earnings estimate (EAR_EST), 
which took the value 1 when the company disclosed this 
information in its reference form and 0 when it did not.
Market communications correspond to the obligation 
described in art. 157, paragraph 4, of Law n. 6,404/1976 
and in art. 2 of CVM Instruction n. 358/2002 (CVM, 
2002). Companies should issue a market communication 
whenever any deliberation (of the general meeting or 
management body) or relevant fact can influence investor 
decisions, which implies the possibility of not disclosing 
or disclosing more than one market communication. 
In light of this, unlike the previous variables, market 
communications did not correspond to a dummy variable 
and their measurement was the result of the natural 
logarithm of the number of communications disclosed 
to the markets in the years chosen for the study.
3.3 Control Variables and Econometric Model
According to Hoffmann (2015), when analyzing the 
relationship between two variables it is necessary for other 
variables that relate with the dependent variables to be 
inserted into the model, since without the presence of these 
the effect between the variables of interest may be masked. 
In this context, and based on the existing literature, the 
control variables used are presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Control variables
Variable Abbreviation Expected relationship Description
Market value LnMAR_VAL +
Calculated by the natural logarithm of the product 
resulting from the number of shares and the quotation on 
December 31st of each year.
Analyst coverage ANA_COV + Corresponds to the number of analysts.
Financial leverage LEV +
Ratio between total debts and total assets in the third 
quarter of each year.
Liquidity IBOV +
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the company 
features in the theoretical portfolio of the Bovespa Index 
and 0 otherwise.
Earnings volatility EAR_VOL +
Calculated by the standard deviation of net earnings from 
the last five financial years.
Market-to-book MAR_BOOK -
Calculated by the ratio between the book value and the 
market value.
Total return TOT_RET +
Calculated by the In (closing value – opening value)/
closing value in the last three months.
Returns volatility RET_VOL -
Indicated by the standard deviation of the daily returns in 
the last 60 days.
Value due to the shareholder LnVAL_DUE - Indicated by the total dividends payable.
Source: Kalay (2015). 
After defining the variables, the analysis of the 
relationships between them was carried out via the 
regression analysis statistical technique, using the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator with balanced 
panel data and year and sector fixed effects, as according 
to equation 1.
ln(NII+1)it = β0it + β1*Disclosure activityit + β2* ln(MAR_VAL)it + β3*ANA_COVit + β4it*LEV 
+ β5it*IBOV + β6*ln(EAR_VOL)it + β7*MAR_BOOKit + β8*TOT_RETit – β9*RET_VOLit + 
β10*ln(VAL_DUE)it + Year/Sector + εit 
1
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To analyze the persistence of the results simultaneously, 
besides the model presented in equation 1, for each 
variable related to the disclosure activities used in the 
research two more regressions were run.
The first, originating from the variable dispersion 
analysis, aimed to verify the persistence of the results 
after removing the variables with the greatest dispersion 
(market value, earnings volatility, and value due to the 
shareholder), implying a sensitivity test of the outliers.
The second regression represented the persistence 
analysis in relation to the number of observations; for 
this, as already mentioned in section 3.1 (Universe and 
Sample), data relating to 2010 were used in an unbalanced 
panel.
Finally, to test the sensitivity of the model to the 
outliers, a median quantile regression was run, conserving 
all the variables of the original model and as described 
in the model presented as equation 2.
(NII+1)it = β0it + β1*Disclosure activityit + β2*MAR_VALit + β3*ANA_COVit + β4it*LEV + 
β5it*IBOV + β6*EAR_VOLit + β7*MAR_BOOKit + β8*TOT_RETit – β9*RET_VOLit + 
β10*VAL_DUEit + Year/Sector + εit 
4. RESULTS ANALYSIS
The results analysis took place in three stages, as 
according to the subsections below: descriptive statistics; 
multiple regressions analysis, including the correlation 
matrix; and sensitivity analysis using median quantile 
regression.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics analysis involved central 
and dispersion tendency measures of the variables 
corresponding to investor sophistication and to the 
disclosure activities (Table 3).
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of the disclosure variables and of the most sophisticated investors
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min. Max. Observations (n)
INST_INV 409.69 758.68 0 7,687 528
COMM 15.26 13.76 0 115 528
IR 0.7576 0.2648 0 1 528
EAR_EST 0.3674 0.4825 0 1 528
COMM = number of market communications; EAR_EST = disclosure of earnings forecasts; INST_INV = number of institutional 
investors; IR = investor relations. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
According to Table 3, the mean quantity of institutional 
investors (INST_INV) presented by the companies was 
approximately 410 investors, with a standard deviation 
of 759, considering a maximum value of 7,587 investors 
and minimum of 0. The breadth of data and the high 
standard deviation indicate the high level of divergence in 
the quantity of institutional investors among the sample 
companies. In addition, the minimum value 0, from 
the perspective adopted for measuring sophistication, 
indicates that some companies have no investors with 
this profile. 
The descriptive analysis of market communications 
(COMM) indicated a mean disclosure of approximately 
15 communications, considering a standard deviation 
of the mean of approximately 14 communications for 
this disclosure activity. The greatest number of market 
communications was published in 2016, corresponding 
to a total of 115 communications. Fourteen companies in 
the sample did not publish market communications, and 
six did not publish communications for more than one 
year, totaling 19 observations among the total analyzed.
Regarding the descriptive analysis of the IR Magazine 
awards (IR) and of the operational and earnings forecasts 
(EAR_EST), both variables are represented by binary 
variables, thus implying a low dispersion of the data in 
relation to the other variables. The best IRs indicated by IR 
Magazine and described by the IR variable contemplate 14 
award categories, which resulted in 21 sample companies 
receiving the award, with some receiving it in more than 
one year, resulting in 40 awarded companies over the six 
years; the mean of the observations corresponds to 0.75 
and the standard deviation to 0.26.
2
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Disclosure of earnings forecasts is not mandatory; 
thus, not all disclosed this information, which implied a 
total of 194 disclosed forecasts among 528 forms analyzed. 
The mean of 0.36 and standard deviation of 0.48 are a 
reflection of the discrepancy between the number of 
companies that published and those that did not publish 
this information.
Considering the dispersion in the number of 
institutional investors (INST_INV), the number of market 
communications (COMM), and seeking to avoid possible 
econometric problems with relation to homogeneity, the 
other analyses were developed using the natural logarithm 
of these variables.
4.2 Relationship between Disclosure Activities 
and Sophisticated Investors
After analyzing the descriptive statistics, the analysis of 
the relationship between the variables corresponding to the 
disclosure activities and sophisticated investors (indicated 
by the number of institutional investors) was carried out 
using the Pearson correlation test and is shown in Table 4.
Table 4
Correlation matrix between the disclosure and sophisticated investors variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) lnINST_INV 1
(2) IR
0.21 1
0.00
(3) lnCOMM
0.51 0.11 1
0.00 0.00
(4) EAR_EST
0.19 0.12 0.23 1
0.00 0.00 0.00
(5) lnMAR_VAL
0.60 0.19 0.43 0.25 1
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(6) ANA_COV
0.14 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.01 1
0.00 0.51 0.50 0.21 0.79
(7) LEV
-0.10 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.14 0.09 1
0.04 0.22 0.71 0.81 0.00 0.04
(8) IBOVESPA
0.52 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.58 0.06 0.00 1
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.98
(9) lnEAR_VOL
0.47 0.05 0.41 0.17 0.55 0.03 0.14 0.59 1
0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.00
(10) MAR_BOOK
-0.12 -0.03 -0.10 -0.07 0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 1
0.01 0.56 0.01 0.10 0.14 0.19 0.78 0.24 0.67
(11) TOT_RET
0.09 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.25 -0.04 -0.13 0.10 0.06 0.06 1
0.06 0.01 0.13 0.54 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.14
(12) RET_VOL
-0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.05 1
0.22 0.36 0.82 0.43 0.49 0.56 0.55 0.25 0.27 0.65 0.21
(13) LnVAL_DUE_SHA
0.28 0.09 0.24 0.07 0.55 -0.11 -0.07 0.32 0.36 0.06 0.15 -0.04 1
0.00 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.41
Note: the values in bold correspond to the Pearson correlation coefficient and the values below these correspond to the p-value.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
According to Table 4, all the correlations involving 
the dependent variable and the disclosure variables were 
significant and positive, but with different intensities. The 
natural logarithm of the quantity of market communications 
(lnCOMM) presented a positive correlation of 0.51 which, 
according to Dancey and Reidy (2019), represents a 
moderate correlation with the quantity of institutional 
investors, thus providing indications of the relationship 
between the number of sophisticated investors and number 
of market communications issued by the companies.
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The IR variable presented a correlation with the 
number of institutional investors (lnINST_INV) of 0.21 
and the earnings forecasts variable (EAR_EST) presented a 
correlation of 0.19. Both correlations, although significant 
and positive, are considered “weak”, indicating a lower 
level of relationship between the variables analyzed.
Regarding the other variables, only one did not 
present a relationship with the number of institutional 
investors: returns volatility (RET_VOL). Only four 
variables presented moderate correlations: the logarithm 
of the number of market communications (0.40), the 
logarithm of market value (0.60), the Bovespa Index 
(Ibovespa) (0.52), and the logarithm of earnings volatility 
(0.47). The others presented a low correlation which, 
according to Dancey and Reidy (2019), is characterized 
as below 0.39.
The coefficients of correlation between the logarithm of 
market value and the Ibovespa (0.58), lnEAR_VOL (0.55), 
and lnVAL_DUE_SHA (0.55) variables, the Ibovespa 
and volatility dependent variables, lnMAR_VAL and 
lnCOMM, and lnEAR_VOL and lnCOMM of earnings 
also presented a positive, significant, and moderate 
correlation.
To deepen the analysis of the correlation between 
these variables, the multiple regression analysis will be 
presented below. Table 5 shows the results for the analysis 
of the relationship between more sophisticated investors 
and the IR variable.
According to Bushee and Miller (2012), an improvement 
in IR provides benefits regarding investment attributes, 
thus promoting an increase in the number of institutional 
investors. In addition, the strategy of improving IR also 
aims to reach individual investors, leading to a positive 
expectation with regards to the IR variable.
Tables 5, 6, and 7 present three regressions. Regressions 
I and II correspond to the results of the balanced panel 
with data from the period from 2011 to 2016, as presented 
in the methodology. However, due to the existence of 
outliers, the regression was run without the lnMAR_
VAL, lnEAR_VOL, and lnVAL_DUE_SHA variables. 
Regression III corresponds to the unbalanced panel with 
data from the period from 2010 to 2016.
Table 5
Analysis of the relationship between investor relations (IR) and sophisticated investors 
Panel A
Variables Expectation (I) (II) (III)
IR
(+) 0.6396 0.9455 -0.9828
(0.1976)*** (0.1955)*** (0.9612)
Ln MAR_VAL
(+) 0.517 - 0.6770
(0.5482)*** - (0.0656)***
ANA_COV
(+) 0.0215 0.0186 0.0322
(0.0110)* (0.0121) (0.0184)*
LEV
(+) -1.2021 -0.6593 0.7641
(0.4445)*** (0.4368) (0.7070)
IBOVESPA
(+) 0.534 1.8129 0.6826
(0.1722)*** (0.1236)*** (0.3503)*
Ln EAR_VOL
(+) 0.211 - 0.2704
(0.0791)*** - (0.0905)***
MAR_BOOK
(-) -0.0007 -0.0005 - 0.0006
(0.0002)** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)***
TOT_RET
(+) -0.2089 0.4135 -0.1494
(0.3600) (0.2613) (0.4001)
RET_VOL
(-) -0.0034 -0.0024 -0.0069
(0.004) (0.0110) (0.0034)**
Ln VAL_DUE_SHA
(-) -0.0272 - -0.0415
(0.0299) - (0.0454)
INTERCEPT
-1.6413 4.3874 -4.0647
(0.9235)* (0.2555)*** (0.9616)***
Fixed effects Year/sector Year/sector Year/sector
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Panel B
Variables Expectation (I) (II) (III)
Adjusted R2 0.5179 0.3598 0.4454
F test 20.34*** 13.45*** 31.22***
Jarque-Bera 21.66*** 7.891** 64.91***
VIF (mean) 1.61 1.38 1.60
White 278.06** 207.17** 274.34*
Wooldridge 0.905 2.6 20.87***
Notes: the betas relating to regressions I, II, and III are shown in bold in panel A; the standard error is presented below the betas, 
in parentheses; panel B represents the result of the analysis of the regression assumptions.
***, **, * = significant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 5 is divided into two sections, in which the first 
(panel A) presents the coefficients of the regressions in 
which the time and sector fixed effects were considered. 
Regression I presented the coefficients obtained, as well 
as the White robust standard error for heteroscedastity, 
when the number of institutional investors (lnINST_INV) 
was related with the IR variable.
Panel B presented the tests carried out for the 
analysis of the regression assumptions, as well as the 
adjusted coefficient of determination. It was verified 
that the residuals of the regression did not present a 
normal distribution and, according to the central limit 
theorem, this assumption can be relaxed, since the mean 
of a particular sample always converges to the normal 
distribution as the sample increases (Brooks, 2014).
The proxy used for the IR measurement was shown 
to be significant at 1%, revealing the positive relationship 
between the IR Magazine award and the number of 
institutional investors, implying that the company 
being awarded increases the logarithm of the number of 
institutional investors by 0.94, ceteris paribus.
Due to this relationship, when the companies were 
awarded by IR Magazine, the variables relating to total 
returns, returns volatility, and value due to the shareholder 
did not present a significant relationship with the 
number of institutional investors. This relationship can 
be explained by the focus of the theory of disclosure, 
since more sophisticated investors process earnings 
forecasts only when private information about company 
performance is disclosed (Kim & Verrecchia, 1994).
To analyze the robustness and persistence of regression 
I, regressions II and III were run. In regression II, the 
company size (ln_MAR_VAL), earnings volatility (EAR_
VOL), and value due to the shareholder (lnVAL_DUE_
SHA) variables were excluded, since these variables, even 
after standardization by the natural logarithm calculation, 
still presented some outliers.
As in the results presented in regression I, regression 
II also presented problems relating to the normality and 
heteroscedasticity of the residuals (panel B); corrected by 
the White robust standard error, the IR variable remained 
significant and positive, as the model expected. The 
coefficient presented a 0.3 increase in relation to equation 
1 and the adjusted coefficient of determination decreased 
to 0.36. The analyst coverage (ANA_COV) and leverage 
(LEV) variables lost statistical significance in regression II. 
Regression III was calculated based on an unbalanced 
panel with the insertion of data relating to 2010, increasing 
the number of observations and totaling 96 companies. 
The standard error presented corresponds to the Newey-
West robust standard error due to the heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation problems. The result of this regression 
revealed sensitivity of the results when the number of 
observations was increased, since the relationship between 
the variables did not persist, implying the absence of a 
relationship between the variables tested. According to 
Kalay (2015), better IR means the disclosure of information 
is greater, as well as making it clearer, which favors less 
sophisticated investors. The author also explains that less 
sophisticated investors are the main ones to benefit from 
this information.
The analysis of the second regression verified the 
relationship between the number of institutional investors 
(lnINST_INV) and the disclosure of earnings forecasts 
Table 5
Cont.
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(EAR_EST), as shown in Table 6. Earnings forecasts provide 
relevant information for investors that helps them to form 
expectations about future earnings and they are indicated 
by the literature as a basis for decisions, especially of 
sophisticated investors (Kalay, 2015). Thus, the expectation 
is for the EAR_EST variable to have a positive coefficient.
Table 6
Analysis of the relationship between earnings forecasts and sophisticated investors 
Panel A
Variable Expectation (I) (II) (III)
EAR_EST
(+) 0.1000 0.288 -0.2028
(0.1439) (0.1474)* (0.2354)
Ln MAR_VAL
(+) 0.5255 - 0.6907
(0.0552)*** - (0.0667)***
ANA_COV
(+) 0.0189 0.0135 0.0313
(0.0112)* (0.0125) (0.0183)*
LEV
(+) -1.323 -0.8454 0.8048
(0.4478)*** (0.4364)* (0.7094)
IBOVESPA
(+) 0.5519 1.8607 0.6867
(0.1695)*** (0.1255)*** (0.3477)**
Ln EAR_VOL
(+) 0.2105 - 0.2736
(0.0799)*** - 0.0994
MAR_BOOK
(-) -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0006
(0.0002)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)***
TOT_RET
(+) -0.1625 0.4985 -0.1248
(0.4160) (0.2902)* (0.4057)
RET_VOL
(-) -0.0031 -0.0016 -0.0071
(0.0042) (0.0118) (0.0033)**
Ln VAL_DUE_SHA
(-) -0.0189 - -0.0469
(0.0308) - (0.0465)
INTERCEPT
-1.7435 4.3229 -4.1234
(0.9223)* (0.2590)*** 0.9513***
Fixed effects Year/Sector Year/Sector Year/Sector
Panel B
Adjusted R2 0.5103 0.3462 0.4457
F test 36.09*** 29.10*** 31.12***
Jarque-Bera 24.36*** 9.993*** 63***
VIF (mean) 1.61 1.37 1.60
White 291.20*** 221.33*** 305.48***
Wooldridge 0.658 2.137 19.95***
Notes: the betas relating to regressions I, II, and III are shown in bold in panel A; the standard error is presented below the betas, 
in parentheses; panel B represents the result of the analysis of the regression assumptions. 
***, **, * = significant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 6, like Table 5, is also divided into two sections 
and presented three regressions. The first section presented 
the coefficients of the regressions, followed by panel B, 
which showed the statistics resulting from the tests of the 
regression assumptions.
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The residuals of the regression did not present a normal 
distribution, as in the relationship between the quantity 
of investors and company awards from IR Magazine. 
With the execution of the White test, problems were also 
identified relating to the heteroscedasticity in the data, 
which resulted in the use of the White robust error.
The analysis of the relationship between the coefficients 
and the dummy variable corresponding to the disclosure 
of earnings forecasts (EAR_EST) did not present statistical 
significance, which implies that the disclosure of earnings 
forecasts is not related with the number of institutional 
investors and, consequently, with more sophisticated 
investors.
Under the lens of the third perspective of the theory 
of disclosure, this result can be explained by the fact that 
companies only disclose such projections when they 
present “good forecasts”. In light of this, institutional 
investors, as agents with a greater capacity to process 
information, may restrict their use of this information 
(Kalay, 2015). The results found here are not consistent 
with those of Kalay (2015), as it is not possible to infer 
that less sophisticated investors use this information. 
As previously described, equation 2 represented the 
persistence of the results when variables are removed 
from the model. On this point, the problems relating to 
the normality and multicollinearity of the residuals were 
also corrected by the White robust error. 
The earnings forecasts variable (EAR_EST) was 
shown to be significant and positive, as expected by 
the model, in opposition with the result obtained in 
regression I. The coefficient of the variable presented 
a 0.188 increase. However, the explanatory power of 
the model was reduced from 51 to 34.5%. The analyst 
coverage variable was the only one that lost significance 
in relation to equation 1.
Regression III of Table 6, like that of Table 5, was 
calculated by adding data relating to 2010 in an 
unbalanced panel. The Newey-White standard error was 
also calculated. The coefficient of the earnings estimate 
did not present statistical significance due to the lack of 
a more robust result, and the relationship between these 
variables was not confirmed.
The analysis of the third regression sought to verify 
the relationship between the number of instructional 
investors (lnINST_INV) and the number of market 
communications disclosed by the companies, as shown 
in Table 7. As described by Kalay (2015) with regards to the 
disclosure of information by companies, less sophisticated 
investors in particular are expected to benefit, as they use 
market communications more often. 
Table 7
Analysis of the relationship between market communications and sophisticated investors 
Panel A
Variables Expectation (I) (II) (III)
Ln COMM
(+) 0.507 0.6595 0.3120
(0.0754)*** (0.0690)*** (0.1152)***
Ln MAR_VAL
(+) 0.4124 - 0.6040
(0.0521)*** - (0.0727)***
ANA_COV
(+) 0.0109 0.0037 0.0300
(0.0114) (0.0123) (0.0186)
LEV
(+) -1.4864 -1.0539 0.2724
(0.4045)*** (0.3810)*** (0.6988)
IBOVESPA
(+) 0.4143 1.3081 0.6890
(0.1599)* (0.1282)** (0.3579)**
Ln EAR_VOL
(+) 0.1623 - 0.2460
(0.0658)* - (0.0917)***
MAR_BOOK
(-) -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0004
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)* (0.0001)***
TOT_RET
(+) -0.0768 0.4348 -0.0754
(0.3157) (0.2514)* (0.3783)
RET_VOL
(-) -0.0032 -0.0024 -0.0062
(0.0050) (0.0106) (0.0035)*
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Panel A
Variables Expectation (I) (II) (III)
Ln VAL_DUE_SHA
(-) -0.0054 - -0.0398
(0.0286) - (0.0459)
INTERCEPT
-1.3695 3.0651 -3.7698
(0.7323)* (0.2719)*** (0.9570)***
Fixed effects Year/Sector Year/Sector Year/Sector
Panel B
Adjusted R2 0.5633 0.3419 0.4414
F test 41.65*** 32.75*** 31.39***
Jarque-Bera 42.26*** 9.627*** 95.28***
VIF (mean) 1.62 1.39 1.61
White 263.61* 203.65* 292.86**
Wooldridge 0.85 2.543 17.95**
Notes: the betas relating to regressions I, II, and III are shown in bold in panel A; the standard error is presented below the betas, 
in parentheses; panel B represents the result of the analysis of the regression assumptions.
***, **, * = significant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The White test revealed heteroscedastic data corrected 
by the White robust error. The number of market 
communications (lnCOMM) disclosure variable was 
shown to be positive and significant, implying that for 
every market communication released by the company, 
the number of institutional investors increases by 0.51.
As in the regressions presented in tables 5 and 6, the 
analysis of the persistence of the results also occurred 
via the execution of regressions II and III. In equation 2, 
heteroscedasticity problems were detected, according to 
the White test, corrected by the robust test. The coefficient 
of the “number of market communications” variable 
presented a 1% probability. In addition, the coefficient 
showed a 0.15 variation in model II with relation to model 
I and the adjusted coefficient of determination also saw 
a reduction from 0.56 in equation 1 to 0.34 in equation 
2. The results of this analysis support the result of the 
first regression, also presented in Table 5, including all 
the control variables.
Regression III, whose Newey-West standard error 
was also used, shows persistence of the result, as the 
coefficient of the lnCOMM variable kept its significance 
and sign, only undergoing a reduction in its value in 
relation to regressions I and II. It shows the relationship 
between institutional investors and the number of market 
communications, implying that the increase in the 
number of sophisticated investors is partly explained 
by the number of market communications. In the study 
by Kalay (2015), the relationship with sophistication 
was shown to be significant, as found here, but that 
study shows more use of market communications by 
less sophisticated investors. 
The combined analysis of the linear regressions enabled 
it to be inferred that the level of sophistication of the 
investors is related to the different disclosure activities, 
as of the three activities analyzed (number of market 
communications, better IR actions, and disclosure of 
earnings forecasts), one was related to the number of 
institutional investors, used here as a proxy for investor 
sophistication.
4.3 Analysis of the Sensitivity of the Model
After the linear regression analysis, the sensitivity test 
of the model was carried out using a median quantile 
regression. The reason for using this test was to verify 
how the disclosure activities related with the quantity 
of sophisticated investors, considering the behavior of 
outliers in the relationship between these variables, as 
presented in Table 8.
Table 7
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Table 8 
Analysis of disclosure activities vs. sophisticated investors 
Panel A
Variables Expectation 0.10 0.50 0.90
IR
(+) 0.981 0.649 0.766
(57.303) (180.201) (1,593.934)
EAR_EST
(+) 0.107 0.356 0.206
(10.214) (20.018) (94.281)
Ln COMM
(+) 0.706 0.000 0.000
(0.533) (1.032)*** (3.401)***
INTERCEPT
0.053 0.048 0.527
(19.446)* (25.603)** (124.394)
Panel B
Wald test 20.34*** 20.34*** 20.34***
Notes: the betas relating to the 0.10, 0.50, and 0.90 quantiles are shown in bold in panel A; the (bootstrap) standard error is 
presented below the betas, in parentheses; panel B represents the result of the significance analysis of the coefficients of the 
model using the simultaneous regression calculation.
***, **, * = significant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 8 presented the results of the analysis of the 
relationship between the variables corresponding 
to IR, the disclosure of earnings forecasts, market 
communications, and to sophisticated investors. To carry 
out that test, the variable corresponding to sophisticated 
investors was included in the model without calculating 
the natural logarithm (NIIit), so that it was possible 
to verify how the variables of the model interact, 
considering all the control variables used in the multiple 
linear regression analysis and ignoring the effect of the 
normalization of the dependent variable data via the 
logarithmic calculation. 
The Wald test in the three quartiles for the general 
significance of the coefficients rejected the null hypothesis 
that poor specification of the model had occurred and 
supported the result obtained by the F test regarding 
the significance of the coefficients in the multiple linear 
regression models.
The analysis of the regression run by quartiles showed 
that the sophisticated investors located in the first quartile 
did not use any of the three disclosure activities for 
making their investment decisions. The first quartile 
groups the companies with the lowest concentration 
of these investors. This result indicates that there is a 
smaller group of sophisticated investors that do not use 
any of the three types of disclosure activities to hold their 
investments in the companies. The analysis in the second 
quartile supports the result obtained by the multiple linear 
regression analysis, in which the activities relating to IR 
and to the disclosure of earnings forecasts were used by 
the most sophisticated investors to make decisions. Only 
the disclosure of market communications presented a 
significant relationship with the sophistication of investors 
in this quartile.
The result indicated that, of the three disclosure 
activities, the median group of sophisticated investors 
only use the disclosure of market communications to make 
investment decisions, instead of using the disclosure of 
earnings forecasts or consulting whether the companies 
they invest in have the best IR, according to the IR 
Magazine awards.
The analysis in the third quartile supports the result 
of the second quartile and the general result obtained 
in the multiple linear regression analysis. The variables 
corresponding to the disclosure of earnings forecasts 
and to IR did not present a significant relationship 
with investor sophistication, so that only the disclosure 
of market communications presented a significant 
relationship with sophistication. 
Based on the median, all the sophisticated investors 
use the disclosure of market communications to make 
investment decisions, instead of using disclosed earnings 
forecasts or whether the companies have been awarded for 
having better IR, according to the IR Magazine award, and 
with the same conditions established in the application 
of the linear regression model.
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5. CONCLUSION
The aim of the study was to verify what the influence 
is of different disclosure activities over the concentration 
of more sophisticated investors in Brazilian companies, 
with the assumption being that there was a relationship 
between these two paradigms (using the lens of the theory 
of disclosure, especially the second and third classification) 
and the theoretical approach of investment decisions to 
maximize earnings and reduce the cost of capital. 
To achieve this objective, data on companies listed 
on the B3 between 2011 and 2016 were used. Investor 
sophistication was categorized based on the number of 
institutional investors reported by these companies in 
their reference forms. Regarding the disclosure activities, 
three activities were evaluated: number of market 
communications, IR, and disclosure of earnings forecasts.
As a result, it was verified that, of the three activities 
studied, only the number of market communications was 
relevant for the most sophisticated investors to hold a large 
portion of their investments in the Brazilian companies. 
Unlike U.S. investors, Brazilian ones do not use earnings 
forecasts to hold their investments in organizations. This 
result persisted after the sensitivity test of the data and 
after the sensitivity test of the model.
This can be explained by the fact that the forecasts 
being disclosed by the companies themselves are at the 
mercy of the cognitive effect of optimism or the influence 
of strong informational asymmetry in companies that 
trade on the Brazilian capital market. 
As a practical contribution, the disclosure of market 
communications is the disclosure activity that most 
influences the concentration of sophisticated investors 
in Brazilian companies, these investors using voluntary 
more than discretionary disclosure to allocate funds.
Among the main limitations of the study, there is the 
unavailability of data, when adapting the variables used 
by Kalay (2015) in the initial version of his study, and the 
process of adapting the variables itself, given that with 
the change in scenarios alterations of certain perspectives 
occur between the studies. Among our suggestions for 
future research, we recommend including other variables 
that correspond to other different disclosure activities 
and another context.
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